Montague v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2001 CarswellOnt 5895 (Ont. S.C.J.)
Yvonne Montague was terminated from her employment at the Bank of Nova Scotia in July, 1991, after working there for nearly 16 years. She sued for wrongful dismissal, and prior to trial the bank admitted it didn't have cause to terminate her employment.
In October 2001 the judge awarded Montague damages equal to 16 months’ notice, plus $5,000 for interest and costs. For her work as a data entry operator Montague had earned $24,750 per year plus a shift bonus of about $1,250 per year. Montague appealed, claiming the judge had awarded too little and that he had been wrong in dismissing her claim for aggravated and punitive damages. The bank cross-appealed, claiming the notice period was too long.
Montague had slipped and fallen at work on Aug. 13, 1990, injuring her right shoulder. She returned to work on a modified work schedule recommended by her doctors, but again fell on Feb. 18, 1991, this time injuring her lower back. She returned to work under a new modified schedule but wasn’t able to sustain it and on April 30, 1991, she stopped working completely.
The bank denied Montague’s claim of long-term disability and informed her if she did not return to her regular duties by July 22, 1991, she would be treated as having abandoned her employment. The letter also indicated she could appeal the rejection of her long-term disability claim if she provided further medical documentation.
Montague said she had made two appointments, on July 12 and July 23, with specialists recommended by her family doctor and she would send reports from those two doctors to the bank. Despite this the bank terminated her employment on July 24 in a letter that made no reference to the two recent medical consultations. Montague successfully sued for her injuries under the Occupiers’ Liability Act and on appeal her request for damages for wrongful dismissal was also successful.
In considering the latest appeals, Justice S.T. Goudge of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross appeal. The original trial judge, he said, had made proper rulings and considered the appropriate precedents throughout. She had found the bank acted precipitously and in bad faith and that Montague had done nothing to suggest she had abandoned her employment.
The judge had also been right, the justice ruled, in using the landmark Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd. and Bardal v. The Globe and Mail Ltd. cases in assessing reasonable damages, which ultimately were within the appropriate range.
“Determining the period of reasonable notice is an art not a science,” Goudge quoted from another justice’s ruling: “An appeal court is not justified in interfering unless the figure arrived at by the trial judge is outside an acceptable range or unless, in arriving at the figure, the trial judge erred in principle or made an unreasonable finding of fact.”
On the matter of extra damages, “there was no malice or vindictiveness by the bank or its officials,” Goudge concluded. “The evidence does not sustain the conclusion that the Bank’s conduct constitutes a separately actionable wrong. Hence punitive damages were properly denied. Moreover, the absence of any separately actionable wrong puts an end to any entitlement to aggravated damages.”
Yvonne Montague was terminated from her employment at the Bank of Nova Scotia in July, 1991, after working there for nearly 16 years. She sued for wrongful dismissal, and prior to trial the bank admitted it didn't have cause to terminate her employment.
In October 2001 the judge awarded Montague damages equal to 16 months’ notice, plus $5,000 for interest and costs. For her work as a data entry operator Montague had earned $24,750 per year plus a shift bonus of about $1,250 per year. Montague appealed, claiming the judge had awarded too little and that he had been wrong in dismissing her claim for aggravated and punitive damages. The bank cross-appealed, claiming the notice period was too long.
Montague had slipped and fallen at work on Aug. 13, 1990, injuring her right shoulder. She returned to work on a modified work schedule recommended by her doctors, but again fell on Feb. 18, 1991, this time injuring her lower back. She returned to work under a new modified schedule but wasn’t able to sustain it and on April 30, 1991, she stopped working completely.
The bank denied Montague’s claim of long-term disability and informed her if she did not return to her regular duties by July 22, 1991, she would be treated as having abandoned her employment. The letter also indicated she could appeal the rejection of her long-term disability claim if she provided further medical documentation.
Montague said she had made two appointments, on July 12 and July 23, with specialists recommended by her family doctor and she would send reports from those two doctors to the bank. Despite this the bank terminated her employment on July 24 in a letter that made no reference to the two recent medical consultations. Montague successfully sued for her injuries under the Occupiers’ Liability Act and on appeal her request for damages for wrongful dismissal was also successful.
In considering the latest appeals, Justice S.T. Goudge of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross appeal. The original trial judge, he said, had made proper rulings and considered the appropriate precedents throughout. She had found the bank acted precipitously and in bad faith and that Montague had done nothing to suggest she had abandoned her employment.
The judge had also been right, the justice ruled, in using the landmark Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd. and Bardal v. The Globe and Mail Ltd. cases in assessing reasonable damages, which ultimately were within the appropriate range.
“Determining the period of reasonable notice is an art not a science,” Goudge quoted from another justice’s ruling: “An appeal court is not justified in interfering unless the figure arrived at by the trial judge is outside an acceptable range or unless, in arriving at the figure, the trial judge erred in principle or made an unreasonable finding of fact.”
On the matter of extra damages, “there was no malice or vindictiveness by the bank or its officials,” Goudge concluded. “The evidence does not sustain the conclusion that the Bank’s conduct constitutes a separately actionable wrong. Hence punitive damages were properly denied. Moreover, the absence of any separately actionable wrong puts an end to any entitlement to aggravated damages.”
